I. INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that the willed, purposive feigning of a mental illness is both uncommon and extremely difficult to sustain. Nevertheless the possibility of simulation as a diagnosis must be remembered especially under certain conditions, e.g. in imprisonment, civilian and military, and when compensation issues arise. If we adopt the criteria of simulation laid down by Farrell and Kaufman (1943) viz. (1) "that no obvious or frank disease or personality disorder is present, (2) that the individual is consciously aware of what he is doing and the motive responsible for his attitude, and (3) that he is fixed in carrying out a purpose to a preconceived result", the diagnosis of simulation will be made only rarely. Simulants often show an abnormal suggestibility and include many hysterics and criminals, notably thieves (Jung, 1902-3) , pseudologists (Utitz, 1918) , psychopaths with "a particular tinge of deceitfulness and lack of social conscience" (Braun, 1928) and Straussler (1919) says of simulants in general "one gets the impression that these people only need to open the sluice-gates which have up till then held back their slumbering pathological 'anlagen' for these to be activated and poured forth in the form of psychotic symptoms". The incidence of simulation is difficult to assess. Jung (1902-3) found 11 simulants in 8,430
admissions to Burgholzli (0 1 3 %), whilst Brussel and Hitch (1943) found 2-7 Y of all patients referred to the neuropsychiatric service of military hospitals in the U.S. during the Second World War were diagnosed as malingerers. In general, because of the growth of knowledge of clinical psychiatry, simulation has been on the whole diagnosed less with the passage of time. C. Norman (1892) remarked the concern of the authorities at the large number of simulations of mental illness in the British Army of that time. This can be contrasted with the relatively small number of such in the First World War (Good, 1942; Roussy and Lhermitte, 1918) despite the ostensibly greater encouragement and opportunity in war. Simulation may be divided into three broad groups:
(1) Clinical simulation;
(2) ritual simulation; (3) experimental simulation. In the first, mental disorder is usually feigned to escape from an intolerable external situation. It may take the form of voluntary and intentional exaggeration or prolongation of a real disorder or of isolated symptoms (Roussy and Lhermitte, 1918) . Klieneberger (1921) reported instances of successful simulation of psychoses amongst German prisoners of war (of whom he was one) in an English internment camp in the First World War. He differentiated 3 forms (1) where the mental "symptoms" were supported by artificially induced physical symptoms such as sleepless or vasomotor disturbances brought about by drugs, e.g. caffeine and aspirin; (2) the production of a bogus but well-informed medical history; and lastly (3) (a) in a group of psychopaths and psychotics, (b) in the healthy. One subject who staged a sham suicidal attempt by hanging and was cut down just in time had a remarkable parallel in the similar attempt of Jones and his associate in a Turkish prisoner of war camp during the same war. The methods used in each case, drugs and careful indoctrination in the phenomena of mental disorder by a doctor in the camp may also be remarked. The role of suggestion by doctors in the production of the so-called prison psychoses so clearly related to simulation probably explains the evidently extreme rarity of these in this country supporting the view of Bleuler (1937) that the "psychopathic delusional states in degenerates" (Birnbaum) would diminish greatly if less attention were paid to them. Social and racial factors may also play a part as in the cases of hysterical puerilism reported by Straussler (1911).
(2) Ritual Simulation Under this heading are included a number of cases reported by the anthropologists. Thus after the ritual "death" and "rebirth" of boys in the ceremonies of initiation to the Kakian association in Ceram, the candidates on return to their village must feign ignorance of their former life, pretend they do not recognize their houses, the use of common objects, that they cannot speak, &c. (Frazer, 1913) . The same author reports similar behaviour amongst some African tribes. In these cases it is questionable whether this is sheer pretence or whether under the influence of powerful affects a state of abnormal consciousness has been induced, or whether as in the hysterical states a mixture of both, since as most writers affirm, e.g. Vorkastner (1928) , Jahrreiss (1928 ), Straussler (1919 , and in agreement with our own experience, the dividing line between conscious and unconscious simulation is nebulous. AUGUST (3) Experimental Simulation Previous experimental studies have been few. Jung (1902-3) believing that the symptom of "vorbeireden" arose in a state of divided attention sought to provoke this experimentally. Using his Word Association method, he distracted the subject's attention by metronome beats and asking the subject to draw a line of a given length at the same time as the stimulus word was given. With increasing rates of metronome beat, Jung noted an appreciable decrease of "inner" associations and a notable increase, inter alia, of sound associations and failure to apprehend the stimulus word. Henneberg (1904) asked naive subjects to feign mental illness and noted the great frequency of "vorbeireden". Hubner (1918) and (1919) trained a number of naive subjects in the simulation of mental illness. One of these, a woman with mild hysterical symptoms, so successfully imitated a patient with a retarded depression that she deceived an experienced psychiatrist. In 1921 0. Loewenstein and his associates R. Mentz and F. Bausch asked 32 subjects to simulate neurological disorder. All the signs produced were those characteristic of hysteria and did not differ objectively from these. Only a few simulated psychiatric disorder, one a severe depression. Bender (1938) carried out experiments in which normal subjects were asked to simulate mental defect using the Bender Gestalt test. "Vorbeireden"
This, the symptom of the "approximate answer", "talking past the point" or "paralogy" was first described by Moeli in 1888 as follows: "The answer is wrong, it is true, but it bears nevertheless some relationship to the sense of the question and shows that the sphere of appropriate concepts has been touched." Thus a sixpence is called a "shilling", a postage stamp "paper" and the like. Ganser (1898) described a "specific twilight state" of which "vorbeireden" was the central and essential feature and which Ganser regarded as hysterical. Nissl (1902) contended that the "vorbeireden" was identical with that found in catatonics and arose from their negativism. In the ensuing controversy the overwhelming balance of opinion turned against Nissl and the hysterical nature of the syndrome was regarded as established. Modem opinion, however, is tending to swing back and Mayer-Gross, for example, has seen a number of cases of Ganser syndrome who later developed a chronic schizophrenia without a clear line of demarcation between the two pictures. The difference between Ganser "vorbeireden" and that found in schizophrenia is less formal perhaps than some (e.g. Jung) have believed. Henneberg (1904) objected to the term "paralogy" since this was already used to denote the similar schizophrenic disorder. There is some confusion over the relationship of Ganser syndrome to pseudodementia. Thus Mayer-Gross et al. (1954) regard them as identical. But Stertz (1910) noted an absence of clouding of consciousness in his pseudodements which is always present in the Ganser state, which accords with our experience. Further, whilst the "vorbeireden" is identical in each and invariable in Ganser it is not always present in pseudodementia. It would seem desirable therefore to separate the two. Henneberg points out that "vorbeireden" may occur under many abnormal as well as in certain normal conditions, e.g. sleep drunkenness, playfulness and preoccupation. Unskilful examination may evoke it as Moeli and many others have stressed. Striaussler (1911) believed the symptom due to a "narrowing of the field of consciousness", distractability and retention disturbance with a loss of associative capacity leading to a faulty recognition of objects. Pick (1917) relates the symptom to a perceptual disturbance in which wholes are not apprehended due to a narrowing of consciousness; he indicates the part played by disturbances in the distribution of attention.
Hahn (1920) pointed out that Pick's view did not explain disturbances in more complicated performances, e.g. arithmetic, and did not explain how the part apprehension arose. Hahn basing his conclusions on the development of colour perception in the child believed that incorrect naming of colours by adults did not arise by chance. In a series of Ganser patients he sought to show that their incorrect naming of colours was a regression in colour perception to an earlier developmental level conditioned by the disturbance of consciousness. The Ganser patient cannot grasp wholes any more than the child or the imbecile can, but whereas in these the inability is due to a defect of previous experience, in the adult Ganser patient it must derive from faulty reproduction, in which, however, the will to answer perversely and to apprehend only a part of the whole may be a factor. This seemed to be the case in some of our simulants. Liebermann (1954) propounds a dynamic interpretation and sees in "vorbeireden" a compromise between the patient's flight from reality and his desire to keep contact with it. Weiner and Braimann (1955) regard "vorbeireden" and loss of personal identity as an attempt by the patient to deceive himself and others by rejecting personality and cognitive functions. Anderson and Mallinson (1941) reported some cases of Ganser syndrome and considered that "vorbeireden" bore a strong resemblance to schizophrenic thought disorder and that formally it was difficult and at times impossible to separate them. We indicated the need for further study of this symptom which formed the starting point of this investiga-514 tion. Recent contributions to the problem of simulation of mental illness have included diagnostic studies by Ossipov (1944), Moersch (1944) , Davidson (1950) , case reports by Good (1942) , Atkin (1951) and Wachspress et al. (1953) who found projective tests of diagnostic value, psychoanalytic studies by Menninger (1935) and Eissler (1951) , but no essentially fresh viewpoint has emerged from these. This experiment was designed to investigate certain aspects of the clinical pictures of simulation presented by normal subjects. The focal point of the investigation is on the psychological factors which underlie "vorbeireden" and other forms of approximate answer, and some of the findings are compared with analogous observations made during the examination in a number of patients with both true and pseudodementia.
Method.-18 undergraduate psychology students (13 men, 5 women) were asked to simulate mental disorder. None was forewarned and each after testing was asked to say nothing of the procedure. No subject had any substantial psychiatric knowledge which might have modified the results. Specific inquiry was made into this point.
The Procedure: The subject was briefed by leaving him alone for 15-20 minutes with a sheet of instructions stating the general purpose of the experiment. The subjects were asked to feign mental abnormality for some reason best known to themselves and were informed that they would be then examined by a psychiatrist as if they were genuine patients. They were told they might behave in any appropriate way.
The subject was then interviewed, the procedure being standardized so far as possible and all interviews carried out by the same investigator (E. W. A.) who tried to maintain a similar attitude on each occasion. Two other investigators acted as observers of the subject's behaviour and a secretary recorded all answers to questions verbatim. The interview proceeded to a set plan, similar in every case, and consisted of a series of questions in pre-arranged order. To elucidate further some of the answers supplementary questions were interpolated from time to time at the examiner's discretion. This system allowed for flexibility and ensured the same ground was always covered.
In the first part of the interview the subject's (supposed) complaints were investigated and hewas questioned on anomalies of mood, delusions, passivity feelings, perceptual disturbances, &c. In the second part orientation, memory, concentration, general knowledge and his performance in simple mental arithmetic were tested.
After an hour's interview the subject was told he should stop simulating. A retrospective inquiry followed (also recorded verbatim) during which the subject was interrogated on the replies given during the examination. Information was sought on the subject's sources of pathological material and why certain kinds of deliberate error had been made and what he had had in mind at the time.
Comparative Investigations
These were made on three other groups of subjects:
(1) A normal group of 50 volunteers drawn from the hospital administrative and technical staff together with some nurses, medical, and P.S.W. students. All were asked to co-operate normally.
(2) An organic group of 25 patients with dementia ranging from mild to severe, and unequivocal evidence of cerebral disease.
(3) A pseudo-dementia group of 10 patients. Only one of these showed a classical Ganser state. The diagnosis of pseudo-dementia was made after several observations.
Although the method of examination of these three groups was similar to that of the experimental subjects since identical questions were given in the same order, the conditions of examination differed in individual cases. The briefing and the retrospective inquiry were omitted; nor was the whole examination carried out in all groups. In the normal and the organic groups only the testing of the sensorium was carried out. Thus the comparison of these three groups with the experimental group relates only to this aspect of the examination. To facilitate this comparison a system was devised, essentially similar to that devised by Whitley (1911) for scoring the responses of patients asked to repeat a given series of digits, but here the procedure was modified and extended to cover all questions, each answer being allotted a point-score depending on the number of mistakes it was possible to make. This system permitted comparisons between one subject and another and between groups of subjects. Clinical Pictures of the Simulant Group With few exceptions none closely resembled well-defined psychiatric disorders or syndromes Even the better performances lacked consistency and were ill-sustained. These states then merely approximated to the familiar clinical categories (Table I) . For instance Subject II was grandiose claiming to have produced a political thesis which, though a masterpiece, had not yet been appreciated as such. In relation to this he complained of persecution by enemies in the disguise of friends plotting to harm him, and of auditory and visual hallucinations. On mental testing he showed definite "vorbeireden" and fatuous or buffoon-like confabulations. For example: Asked to repeat digits he responded with a series of unrelated numbers which he said later, on retrospective inquiry, were the telephone numbers of his friends. It appeared that the easier the question the more difficult did he find the answer. Thus asked to add 5 and 11 he did this correctly; 9 and 8 was, he said: "a year older"; and 2 and 3 was: "a difficult one".
Subject 12 was possibly the most interesting. He gave a false name, as did some of the others, said he was the author of "Mein Kampf" but at the same time was aged 19 and a University student. After this "double orientation" he expressed some delusional ideas during which he stuttered profusely and became increasingly agitated. At one juncture he rose from his chair, stated that he had seen a face leering at him through the window and insisted that all the windows be shut. Of interest was his continuous talking past and around the point producing a strong impression of disordered association, e.g.
Q. "Do you smoke?"
A. "You see the thing is it's best to use Cherry Blossom. You have to clean your shoes because the shoes are the most vulnerable part-if they have a polished surface the gamma rays can't get at you. You have to walk on the edge of the pavement, if you leave it you have absolutely had it because they have a way of keeping these rays running right along the edge of the pavement." Q. "Do you have any morbid ideas ?" A. "Well it's the branches on trees-it's the way they stick out-they're pointing in all directions-you just can't take them, they rustle and they speak. You have to be very careful about these trees, they're black and significant, you must be careful and not let them touch you." Even this picture lacked consistency and later on the subject's answers became more and more normal. He subsequently admitted that increasing fatigue made the role difficult to sustain. A similar observation regarding the pull of the reality situation was made by a number of the other subjects. Subject 18 simulated a picture different from all the others. She behaved in a childish ridiculous way; was coy, flirtatious, capricious and evasive. She fairly successfully produced an impression of a shallow immature and brittle hysteric. On mental testing her fatuousness increased to buffoonery. Asked to repeat a series of digits she replied: "1-2-3-4-5" on two occasions. To: "Who is the Prime Minister?"-"A man!"; "How many sorts of cards in a pack?"-"Lots of red ones and black ones"; "The difference between ice and glass?"-"It makes a nice noise ice-a tinkling noise when you rattle it"; Retrospectively she said she felt as if the role were taking hold of her. It also seemed as if she experienced a split for she spoke of "two processes of thought, one thinking deeply to prevent me from thinking deeply". Not all gave approximate answers or "vorbeireden". Some produced a sprinkling, only a few a substantial number of such responses, though there were, all told, sufficient to provide some information as to the mechanism of production. This was not always so straightforward as in one case who asked why he made 26 and 18 equal to 43 replied that he had felt he should give if not the right answer then something very near it. In many cases the matter was more complicated. One subject who made four times thirteen equal to 54 stated that she at first decided to say 39 (3 x 13) then to change it to 49 as being nearer the correct answer but further decided to "mess the answer about a bit" and finally replied: "Fifty-four". Despite this triple displacement the answer was given reasonably promptly. Another subject said of his reasoning: "Supposing I am asked to add 2 and 2. The answer comes: 4. What shall I do?
Give an approximate answer: 5. No, that's not good enough-say 6." He later perceived the fallacy and realized that genuine patients did not usually give approximate answers of this kind but only those who knew the real answer and were trying to simulate.
The transposition and reversal of some of a given series of digits was a type of approximation given by most subjects. One said he felt that it would appear "more genuine" to get the actual digits in wrong order rather than fail to remember any or substitute new ones. In not all was the rearrangement, transposition or reversal of digits deliberate. One subject: "didn't definitely memorize them but picked out a few here and there and let them come out as they would." Another described an attempt at double-bluff. He first wished to show there was nothing wrong by answering the questions correctly but felt that by slipping in a wrong answer every now and then as apparently unintentionally as possible that he could put across the idea that a genuine disturbance was present. Reversal of digits was, he believed, just the kind of mistake that would appear unintentional. Some missed out digits or gave them in wrong order by deliberately not listening intently when the series were given. Another stated: "The first time you said the numbers I was so busy thinking about how to react I really didn't hear them. That gave me a clue."
The turning of an accidental mistake to deliberate use appeared on several occasions with different subjects, e.g. the reply: "Twenty-one shillings" when the name of the reigning Sovereign was asked. This subject stated later that at the time he momentarily, though genuinely, confused a sovereign with a guinea and at once saw in this an opportunity to simulate a disordered association. (One of the organic patients produced an almost identical response to this question: "A guinea!") The same simulant produced many approximate answers. Asked to identify a number of coins he called them "ovals" and "discs". Later he explained his replies were a reaction to a part-the shape the coin was represented by on the retina-rather than to the whole coin itself.
These examples illustrate some of the mechanisms underlying the production of vague and approximate answers as produced by the simulant group. Although variable in extent and in the manner of their production the subjects usually felt that the answers they gave must, if wrong, be not too far wide of the mark to avoid an impression of spuriousness. To judge the truth of this, the comparative investigation was carried out on the other three groups of subjects. Discussion and Results of Comparative Investigations The difference between the 4 groups of subjects according to the percentage errors of all kinds made (Table II) shows that the pseudo-dementia group did worst making a greater % Positive (commission) errorpoints 44f 11870°n umber of errors than the group of organic patients. The group of simulants did much better. Nearly half approached the average normal performance, though they showed much greater range and variability largely due to two of their members (Subjects 11, 18) who produced a performance more abnormal than any other members of any group and in this respect were approached by a few only of the more dilapidated organics.
Contrasting the responses of each group to each one of the 32 questions on memory, orientation, &c., in relation to the whole performance, few significant differences emerge. The overall pattern of each group is remarkably similar. Those questions which the normals found most difficult to answer accurately proved especially difficult for the organics and vice versa. The same was however true of both the simulants and the pseudo-dements suggesting an endeavour to simulate abnormality by using or exaggerating genuine difficulties. This similarity of pattern is most evident in the number of errors made in digit repetitions which become progressively more difficult as the series lengthen.
The only significant differences emerged in relation to orientation in time. Here the pseudodements made over three times and the simulants nearly twice the percentage of errors made by the organics. In relation to the total overall performance of the groups the number of errors in time orientation by the pseudo-dements as opposed to the organics appears significant (at less than 1 in 20). Detailed examination shows that asked the time of day most of the organics could make a guess correct to within an hour or an hour and a half. Vague answers, e.g. "morning" or "afternoon" occurred more frequently with simulants and pseudo-dements; gross errors, e.g. "midnight" when the sun was actually shining, and "7 p.m." when it was 10 a.m., while occasionally produced by very dilapidated organics (only in one of the present series) were much more frequent in the pseudo-dements.
The only other difference on quantitative analysis was a tendency for some sitnulants to do rather better than expected in the questions asked near the end of the examination. This was due to fatigue for, towards the end some of the subjects experienced difficulty in sustaining the role.
Considering the more qualitative aspects of the answers given some further differences emerge:
If the errors made be divided into positive or commission errors and negative or errors of omission the proportion varies from group to group (Table II) . The smaller proportion of negative or omission errors made by the normals can be construed as a measure of their willingness to co-operate. In the organics the ratio of negative to positive error points is almost equal, while in the simulants and the pseudo-dements the proportion of negative error points is increased, the picture being in this respect opposite to that of the normals. This negative bias and the much greater proportion of frank refusals to answer can be interpreted in terms of the lack of co-operation so obviously a feature of the examination of patients with pseudo-dementia and probably reflects the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory histories.
However, it is the type of positive or commission errors which are of greater interest. Considering simple approximate answers -of the "two-and-two-make-five" kind normal subjects make a substantial number of these, probably due to anxiety. However, gross "vorbeireden," e.g. calling coins "discs and ovals" although undoubted approximations, were not given by the normal subjects. The simulants made a significantly higher number of these grosser errors than did either of the other two abnormal groups. There was, however, little difference in the proportion of grosser errors made by the organics and pseudo-dements, a circumstance probably accounted for by the somewhat negative and colourless clinical picture produced by most of the pseudo-dements.
As with simple approximations so with the transposition and reversal of digits. The proportion of these errors made by normals was double that made by the organics and more than three times that made by the simulants and pseudo-dements. Nevertheless, although the percentage proportion of transposition and simple approximate errors made by normal subjects appears large it must be remembered that the total number of all errors made by normals is small. Considering total overall performance the pseudo-dementia group made a significantly greater number of simple approximate errors while the simulants lay, in this respect, between them and the organics, though nearer to the latter. There is thus some basis for the belief of the association of this kind of error with pseudorather than with true dementia. This, however, does not appear true of transposition and reversal errors since the organics made a significantly higher number of this kind of mistake than either the simulants or the pseudo-dements. It appears, therefore, that if a patient gives back some of a series of digits in the wrong order, or, when asked to repeat, e.g. the months of the year in reverse he transposes some elements of the answer, this is not necessarily a deliberate approximation. It may be due in the first instance to an attention defect or in the second to inability to shift or perseveration.
In fact perseveration is a feature which appears to distinguish sharply the performance of organic patients from that of simulants or those with pseudo-dementia. In 7 patients of the organic group the responses showed marked perseveration; in the responses of 4 others though less striking it was still obvious. In addition perseverative tendencies were perceptible in the replies of 6 of the remaining 14 organic patients. In contrast, no perseverative quality of a gross kind was apparent in the responses either of the experimental simulants or those of the pseudo-dements. On close scrutiny the replies of one simulant and two of the patients with pseudo-dementia showed a slight perseverative tendency which was only doubtfully evident in the responses of a few of the others.
In conclusion it must be stated that although the performance of the experimental simulant group is similar in many respects to that of the pseudo-dements there are sufficient differences between the two to make one wary of making assumptions about the latter based on the retrospective analysis carried out as part of the experimental procedure. Further investigation is required to determine whether such a comparison is valid. Apart from the familiar difficulty of comparing the malingerer with the hysteric it has to be considered whether any person prepared to go so far as to simulate mental, or for that matter any other kind of disorder, can safely be contrasted with one who does so purely in the spirit of co-operation in an academic experiment.
We wish to express our thanks to Miss Doris Bee, M.A., who gave us invaluable help in recording the experimental data. REFERENCE WHITLEY (1911) Arch. Psychol.. N.Y., No. 19, p. 45 (quoted LYON, D. 0. (1917) In all societies part of the education of the child includes the delicate balance between frankness, simulation, lying, integrity, hypocrisy, &c. By simulation we control anxiety and preserve the appropriate level for social communication and interaction. Most of us live to varying degrees by this mechanism. Rejection of it may become a psychiatric symptom, the obsessional concern with the truth, the compulsive telling of the truth (David Riesman, 1952) . Simulation is one of the bases of drama. Simulation occurs in cross-cultural contact. It often occurs in present-day society where economic situations are personalized on a mass scale (Wright Mills, 1951) . These types of simulation may be said to have some positive social value.
In Part I brief mention was made of dynamic formulations of the Ganser syndrome and by implication of simulation also. The individual's language behaviour is a compromise formation, a symptom in the same way that non-organic limping is a compromise between complete immobility and full normal function. Liebermann (1954) considers the Ganser syndrome as "a last ditch effort to preserve the ability of the ego to invest in objective reality". The time taken by the psychiatric examination reported above made lengthy psychological testing impossible. However, one minor hypothesis was put to the test: the subject feigning mental illness presented with a psychological test, has no stereotype to guide him. A Visual Motor Gestalt Test was chosen, both because of its brevity and because its author, Lauretta Bender (1938) has reported on its use with Ganser patients and in malingering.
The test was given to 13 of the 18 student subjects already mentioned. 9 subjects produced abnormal records.
The performance of Subject 18 was the most deviant. She reported that she deliberately incorporated the test into the role she was playing. Card A was drawn with the diamond half imposed on the circle. Introspecting later she says-"The circle was drawn indecisively." Card 1 is drawn rapidly as a single unbroken straight line. Card 2 is reduced to a single wavy line, "I didn't want it to be accurate or exact". Card 3 becomes a very distorted figure 8,-"Just a squiggly line" she says. Card 4: she reproduces the wave line but swings it round and places a wavy square above it joined with a narrow bar. She writes the word "feather" in large rather childish writing. Card 5 again has a steep wave with a small circle surmounting it. She says, "A hat with a pom pom", and again writes "hat" beside it.
Card 6 she began with a wavy line trailing off to a short straight line. The vertical line is crossed by the horizontal exactly at 90 degrees and then switches away to the left in a faint curve. This demonstrates clearly that the Gestalt is correctly perceived and deliberately altered. On Card 7 she refused; but makes a large heavy pencil cross on the face of the card itself, permanently damaging it. Asked whether she had given herself up completely to the role at this point, she said "No, there was the pull of reality". Card 8 is a mass of childish scribble. Such decline in quality is most improbable in a .genuine patient.
When finished drawing she was asked to associate to the cards. To Card 2 she says "No", and then, "dominoes." This suggests that her drawing of a wavy line was a deliberate distortion, since she had correctly perceived the pattern. One could thus rule out any genuine perceptual disturbance. The psychiatrist concerned with the detection of simulation, especially when time does not permit him to see the patient on a second occasion, or limits him to a short interview without benefit of an externally verified history, may be helped by considering the report from a clinical psychologist who has tested the patient.
In some few of the cases of simulation reported in the literature, psychological tests have been used, e.g. Wachspress, Berenberg and Jacobson (1953) report 3 cases from an American Army General Hospital. Benton (1945) and Rosenberg and Feldberg (1944) report on the Rorschach among military malingerers. There is a small but relevant literature on the extent to which subjects can consciously distort their test results, e.g. Fosberg (1938) . Carp and Shavzin (1950) gave the test to 20 subjects once asking them to make a good impression, and once to make a bad impression. Only 3 of 20 subjects managed to alter their patterns to an extent significant at the 5% level. Gibby (1951) inquired into the kind of individuals who were able to effect the greatest change in their performance. These seemed to be the relatively mature and rich personalities, neither rigid nor restricted.
Feldman and Graley (1954) using two groups of University students, N = 72, found that students could alter their records but the results had more in common with neurotic than psychotic records. Four judges were able to distinguish the faked from the normal records.
As soon as possible after simulation the subjects were given a "normal" Rorschach. The purpose of this was to consider the relation between the personality structure so revealed, and the simulated role as evaluated by the psychiatrist. Results will be published later.
